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Abstract. This research paper examines the differences between developing and advanced 
countries in terms of public investment’s impact on economic growth. In this regard, we 
investigate whether or not the macroeconomic impact of government investment spending 
is tributary to the degree of private-public capital substitutability and the level of the 
capital-to-GDP ratio. In this perspective, we use a panel data model for two groups of 
countries that include respectively five advanced economies and five developing ones. Our 
study provides empirical evidence that public investment expenditures have a larger 
influence on GDP’s evolution in developing countries. Our results also suggest that public 
investment spending is relatively counterproductive in advanced economies, most likely 
because of high levels of crowding out; the latter are driven by public-private capital 
substitutability and the advanced position of these countries in terms of transitional 
dynamics. The analysis in this paper also sheds the light on efficiency, as a concept that is 
significantly linked to the level of corruption. 
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1. Introduction 
he role of governments in supporting economic growth has been subject to 
large controversies, particularly when it comes to public spending, starting 
from the Keynesian-Classical debate in the 1930s. Since then, the 
differences in terms of perspectives have continued, yet in various forms. In this 
framework, a particular interest was given to government investment expenditures 
during the second half of the 20th century, as several industrialized countries were 
in a post-war reconstruction phase, and colonization was over in most developing 
countries, bounding them to shape their respective economies.  
In both groups of countries, a strong correlation was established between public 
investment spending, GDP growth and social welfare in several cases. This model 
was, however, severely criticized during the stagflation episodes in the 1970s. As a 
consequence, the research regarding public investment’s impact on economic 
growth began to lose momentum in the late 1970s and the 1980s. The cons of 
public investment spending seemed to have prevailed. 
However, the debate regarding the macroeconomic impact of public investment 
was revived by an empirical study led by Aschauer (1989), which examined the 
 
aa Mohammed V University of Rabat, Faculty of Economics & Law, Agdal Applied Economics Lab., 
Morocco. 
. +212 616-555251 
. hichamkgoumrhar@gmail.com 
 b†  Mohammed V University of Rabat, Faculty of Economics & Law, Agdal Applied Economics Lab., 
Morocco. 




Journal of Economics Bibliography 
JEB, 4(1), H. Goumrhar, & Y. Oukhallou, p.77-86. 
78 
productivity growth generated by non-military government investment in the 
United States. The paper demonstrated, through a Cobb-Douglas econometrical 
model, that investment in infrastructure drive an upward influence on private firms’ 
productivity, thereby generating a significant crowding in effect. The post-1970 
productivity decrease was found to be the result of the drop in public investment in 
the US.  
This finding is relatively supported by the important GDP growth rates in Asia 
during the 1990s, which were significantly correlated with the substantial rates of 
public investment that characterized that region. Nonetheless, the causality in this 
framework –and even the correlation sign in several studies, remained quite 
controversial. Using the same data as Aschauer (1989) but with all the coefficients 
of the production function estimated in first differences, Sturn & De Haan (1995) 
found that the positive relation between public investment and GDP discovered by 
Aschauer had been overvalued (Sturm, & De Haan, 1995). On the other hand, 
Mittnik & Neumann (2001) argued in favor of the significant positive impact of 
public investment on economic growth in the short run and a lesser influence in the 
long run. Based on a VAR model, the authors discarded the existence of crowding 
out effects in the cases of six advanced countries. Also using a VAR methodology, 
Voss (2002) argued that innovations to public investment actually crowd out 
private investment in developed economies such as Canada and the United States. 
An interesting contribution to the debate was made by Perotti (2004), whose 
study concluded that output and private investment in advanced countries tend to 
react more significantly to public consumption shocks, than to government 
investment. According to the author, this puzzle could find explanation in the fact 
that countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada 
and Germany might have public capital-to-GDP ratios that are beyond their 
respective optimal levels. As a consequence, further public investment could have 
a very weak, or even negative, marginal return. Kamps (2004) corroborates this 
explanation for the case of Japan, where public investment was found to have a 
downward influence on GDP growth. 
The arguments used by studies such as Perotti (2004), Kamps (2004) or Barro 
(1990) generally support that public investment is not effective, or even 
counterproductive in certain cases (negative multiplier). They argue that this is 
mostly due to the existence of a large ratio of public capital. Therefore, it is fair to 
mention that some of the aforementioned findings could probably not be extended 
to developing countries, which usually have lower levels of capital stocks and 
observable infrastructure shortages. 
Khan (1996) explored the influence of public and private capital spending on 
GDP growth in 95 developing countries using panel data methodology and two-
stage least squares (TSLS). Both private and public investments were found to 
have a macroeconomic impact, with the former having a much more significant 
one than the latter. Ghani & Din (2006) roughly confirmed this conclusion for the 
Pakistani case, as they discovered that growth is mostly driven by private 
investment. However, their empirical study revealed that public investment has a 
negative (although insignificant) influence on GDP, which “raises some concern 
about the efficiency of public investment” in Pakistan (Ghani, & Din, 2006).  
  On the other hand, Bédia (2007) found that in Ivory Coast, government 
investment seems to drive a larger influence on economic growth than private 
investment. Bédia (2007) dismissed the existence of significant crowding out, 
along with Agénor & Montiel (1996) and Hemming et al., (2002) who argue that in 
the case of small and middle income countries, fiscal deficits tend to have a 
negligible influence on interest rates, while crowding out is more likely to occur in 
advanced economies. Other studies confirmed this finding, such as Boughzala et 
al., (2007) and Ismihan et al., (2002), for the Tunisian and Turkish frameworks 
respectively. 
This paper aims to provide the research community with further evidence on the 
factors that determine the extent of public investment’s macroeconomic influence. 
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The emphasis is laid on the potential differences between developed and 
developing countries in terms of public capital profitability. In this frame, we test 
the validity of the rules-of-thumbs developed by Oukhallou (2016) through a panel 
data econometrical model for two groups of countries, with respectively five 
advanced economies and five developing ones. 
 
2. Research Methodology 
A thorough analysis of the empirical literature, along with Oukhallou (2016), 
enables us to draw the following hypotheses on the potential determinants of public 
investment’s impact on the economic activity:  
Hypothesis 1: Efficiency stands out as a transversal variable, whether through 
the fight against corruption or the enforcement of macroeconomic profitability-
based selectivity of investment projects and government expenses in general. In 
this context, when further public investment spending does not follow efficiency 
and profitability-based selectivity, its marginal productivity is most likely to shrink 
as the negative macroeconomic impact of the crowding-out effect partially –or 
even totally- neutralizes the supposedly positive effect of said public investment on 
GDP growth. This can also be applied to government current expenditures. 
Hypothesis 2: From a “transitional dynamics” perspective, public investment is 
likely to have a larger effect in small and middle income countries where the 
capital stock to GDP ratio is usually the lowest. In this category of countries, the 
margin of improvement in terms of infrastructure is important, among other 
development and economic variables. Returns generated by further private or 
public investment are assumed to be positive but progressively diminishing, ceteris 
paribus. 
Hypothesis 3: The higher is the public-private investment substitutability, the 
more important is the crowding out effect, which drives a downward influence on 
public investment’s effectiveness. The substitutability is more present in advanced 
economies than in developing ones, which could explain why the public investment 
multiplier effect is found to go up to 1.4 in middle income countries while it is 
weak –and even negative in some cases- in advanced economies (Hemming et al., 
2002). 
The validity of these hypotheses is assessed according to a panel data model 
tackling the case of two different groups of countries. The first group encompasses 
five advanced countries, while the second gathers five developing economies. The 
next subsection provides further explanations on the data, the model’s variables 
and other econometrical aspects. 
 
2.1. Building the data panel model 
In this model, we evaluate the correlation between output and public investment 
expenditures in two panels of countries based on 15-year period data (2000-2015). 
The first panel consists of five advanced economies, i.e. Denmark, Germany, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. As for the second panel, it includes Chile, 
Colombia, Jordan, Morocco and Slovenia. The total number of observations is 
therefore 80 for each panel. 
Besides from public investment spending and GDP, we added other exogenous 
variables, such as gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) and public (non-
productive) consumption expenditures. The model also encompasses the 
demographic evolution, which supposedly adds more explanatory power to its 
results. The latter is, to a certain extent, based on the works of Reynolds (1985; 
1994).  
In this frame, allowances are made between productivity-enhancing public 
spending and other purchases, based on the definition provided by a significant part 
of the empirical literature.  
The data panel model is as follows: 
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𝑌𝑖𝑡 = ∝1. 𝐺𝐼𝑖𝑡 +∝2. 𝐺𝐶𝑖𝑡 +∝3 . 𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +∝4. ∆𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡  
 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡  is the gross domestic product at purchaser’s prices for a given 
country in a given time. Data for all variables are in U.S. dollars, as they were 
converted from each country’s domestic currencies using 2000-2015 average 
exchange rates. By doing so, the objective was to reduce possible distortions due to 
fluctuations in exchange rates, which could be wrongfully interpreted by the model 
as a significant fall or decrease in a given variable. Compared to previous 
computations, this technique helped improve the quality of the model’s outputs. In 
both panels, GDP’s data source is the World Bank’s national accounts database. 
𝐺𝐼𝑖𝑡  represents government investment expenditures, i.e. the part of public 
budget that is dedicated to investment spending. For this particular variable and in 
the absence of reliable data series, we created an alternative series using data 
mining based on the information contained in government reports (ministries of 
finance and central banks mostly) for the cases of Chile, Colombia, Germany, 
Jordan, Morocco, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. As regards to public investment 
spending in Denmark and in the United Kingdom, we collected consistent data 
from their respective statistics offices.  
As for 𝐺𝐶𝑖𝑡 , it represents public consumption expenditures’ annual evolution in 
the examined countries. This variable was included in the model since its analysis 
would enable us to make allowances between productivity-enhancing public 
spending and non-productive government purchases. This is also supposed to give 
hints on the degree of crowding out, if public consumption’s impact on GDP 
growth is found to be equal or larger than public capital expenditures’. Unlike 
government investment expenditures, public consumption is usually not financed 
by debt. In both panels, the government consumption expenditures’ data source is 
the World Bank’s national accounts database. 
𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡  is the gross fixed capital formation per country and per year, which 
includes both public and private investments. This variable is often considered as a 
proxy to public investment (see IMF (2015) and Allain-Dupré et al., (2012), among 
others). However, this research focuses on the degree of effectiveness of the actual 
public spending in term of investments. As a consequence, GFCF was merely 
chosen in order to enable the comparison between the real impact of variations in 
the actual capital stock (GFCF) and the one driven by variations in government 
investment expenditures. It is also an intuitive mean to assess the public investment 
expenditures’ degree of efficiency. At this point, we consider GFCF’s impact on 
GDP as a relatively optimal benchmark. For this variable, data series were taken 
from the World Bank database. 
∆𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡  represents the annual variation of the resident population per country. 
By introducing this variable in the model, we intend to assess the impact of the 
demographical influence on GDP growth especially that we do not consider per 
capita variables in this very estimation. The choice of this variable is also based on 
theoretical elements discussed in the literature (see Reynolds 1985; 1994) among 
others). 
Table 1 displays the average shares in GDP of public investment, public 
consumption and GFCF in our panel of advanced countries, while Table 2 shows 
these figures in the case of developing economies. 
GFCF in the developing countries takes larger shares of GDP (an average of 
24.13 percent) compared to the advanced economies (21.15 percent). The same 
goes for public investment (4.09 and 2.97 respectively). On the other hand, public 
current expenditures take more important proportions in the developed countries, 
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Table 1. GFCF, Public Investment and Concumption in the 1st Panel (% of GDP) 
 Denmark Germany Spain Sweden UK Panel 
Pub. Investment 2.38 2.07 4.08 4.32 2.01 2.97 
Pub. Consumption 25.68 18.74 18.59 25.35 20.13 21.70 
GFCF 20.47 20.07 25.09 22.74 17.40 21.15 
 
Table 2. GFCF, Public Investment and Concumption in the 2st Panel (% of GDP) 
 Morocco Chile Colombia Jordan Slovenia Panel 
Pub. Investment 5.14 3.07 3.50 5.73 3.00 4.09 
Pub. Consumption 16.73 11.40 16.77 21.04 19.08 17 
GFCF 27.29 22.00 22.52 25.03 23.81 24.13 
 
Among the advanced countries, Spain is last in terms of public consumption, in 
a clear contrast with the two Scandinavian countries and the UK. This finds 
explanation in the differences in terms of social protection-related expenses and 
transfers, as an important part of these expenditures is statistically considered as 
public current spending. As a matter of fact, the social security systems in 
Denmark, Sweden and the UK are very advanced in this framework compared to 
Spain’s1. 
As regards to public investment, Jordan and Morocco seem to have the largest 
ratios, at 5.73 percent and 5.14 percent respectively. And in terms of GFCF, 
Morocco is by far predominant, which could be explained by the substantial 
investment strategies that characterized the 2000s and helped promote domestic 
private investments and attract significant FDI. 
 
2.2. Estimation method and statistical tests 
The compound error model used in the present estimation follows this logic: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0+ β𝑥𝑖𝑡  + 𝑢𝑖𝑡    ; i = 1,….. , n    et t = 1,…., T               
 𝑢𝑖𝑡  = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  
 
Where xit  is the explanatory variable and yit  is the continuous variable with 
constant  β0 . The component αi  represents the characteristic of the individual 
i,while β is the parameter of interest and ϵit  is the error term that follows a 
distribution N (0,σ2). The term  uit  denotes the compound error of the model, 
hence the name "One-Way Error Component Regression Model". On the other 
hand, if the parameter αi  is fixed then the panel model is with individual fixed 
effects, and if αi is random then we would be dealing with an individual random 
effects model. 
The estimators used in this framework are: the Within estimator for the fixed 
effect model and the generalized least squares (GLS) estimator for the random 
effect model. The Hausman (1978) test consists of comparing the GLS and Within 
estimates to choose the appropriate model, i.e. a fixed effect model (FEM) or an 
error components model (ECM). The test statistic is written as follows: 
 
𝐻 =  𝛽 𝐹𝐸𝑀 − 𝛽 𝐸𝐶𝑀 
′
[𝑉 (𝛽 𝐹𝐸𝑀) − 𝑉 (𝛽 𝐸𝐶𝑀)]
−1 𝛽 𝐹𝐸𝑀 − 𝛽 𝐸𝐶𝑀  →  𝑋
2(𝑘) 
 
Under the null hypothesis of correct specification, this statistic is asymptotically 
distributed according to a Chi-square with K degrees of freedom, i.e. the number of 
time-varying factors introduced into the model. If the test is significant (P-value 
strictly below 5 percent), the choice falls on the fixed-effect model estimators, 
since they would be unbiased. 
Based on this methodology and as explained below, the estimators proposed in 
this research are the fixed effect model estimators. This model, also called the 
 
1 Eurostat (2016), Social Protection Statistics, June. 
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covariance model, assumes that αi are constant and non-random effects. Also, it is 
assumed to have a residue structure that verifies the standard assumptions of OLS. 
Before turning into the model’s econometrical results for both panels of 
countries, it is necessary to carry out a number of tests to examine the robustness 
and the choice of the model. We particularly use the Breusch Pagan tests of the 
absence of individual specific effects, the Hausman test for the choice of the model 
and the Modified Wald test for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of errors.  
In our specific case, the Breusch Pagan test reports an x² statistic with a 
probability of less than 5 percent, thereby allowing the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of absence of individual specific effects. As for the Hausman test, it 
yields a p-value that is lower than 0.05, thereby enabling for the rejection of the 
null hypothesis; hence the model should be a fixed-effect one. And only the 
Between (inter-country) and Within (intra-country) estimators would be effective 
in this case. 
We chose the within estimator rather than the Between, since it generates more 
consistent results. Although the Between estimator makes it possible to take 
account of the impact of structural factors in the panel, this relative advantage 
comes at the expense of cyclical influences, which are highly important in our 
analysis. In other words, the Between estimator does not take into account the 
persistence of the fixed individual effects. Furthermore, the Between estimator 
reduces the number of observations since each 𝑋(𝑘;𝑖𝑡) is replaced by its individual 
mean 𝑋 (𝑘;𝑡) which often leads the estimator to lose some of its effectiveness.   
The modified Wald test provides a Chi-2 with a p-value of less than 5 percent, 
which leads us to accept the hypothesis of residual heteroskedasticity. Globally, the 
coefficients of the variables of interest are robust and the errors related to the 
econometric techniques would be substantially reduced. 
 
3. Empirical Results 
The estimates of the model are shown in Table 3 below. In both panels, all 
coefficients are found to be significant at least at the 5 percent level, except for the 
ones related to population’s evolution, which are not found to have any noticeable 
effect on GDP growth in our pattern. 
 
Table 3. The Results of the Data Panel Estimations:  
Dependent variable: GDP in US dollars (in logarithm) 


















Number of id 







Sigma_u                                              0.3504 0.2202 
Sigma_e 0.04726 0.0225 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Note: * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, and *** significant at 1%, respectively 
 
The parameters Sigma_u and Sigma_e represent respectively the intra-country 
variance (Within) and the inter-country variance (Between) 
The most striking result is the difference between the two groups of countries in 
terms of the macroeconomic impact of public investment expenditures. In the panel 
of developed economies, the coefficient that is associated with public investment 
spending is slightly negative, as opposed to the group of developing countries. The 
sign of this correlation corroborates evidence provided by Hemming et al., (2002). 
It finds a plausible explanation in the substantial level of public-private investment 
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substitutability –in advanced countries, which generates higher crowding out 
effects; hence the downward influence on public investment expenditures’ 
effectiveness in said countries. This finding is directly linked to the 3rd hypothesis 
mentioned above, which states that the higher is substitutability the lower is the 
public investment multiplier effect. This does not apply to the five developing 
countries in our 2nd panel, since their public investment spending tackles essentially 
the supposedly existing infrastructure shortages, hence its alleged non-
substitutability as regards to private investment. Besides, historical evidence shows 
that government deficits tend to have very little influence on interest rates in low 
and middle income countries, thereby generating insignificant levels of crowding 
out. 
Also, GDP seems to react more significantly to government consumption than 
to public investment expenditures in the advanced economies. This result confirms 
the existence of significant levels of crowding out, since public current expenses 
are not financed by public debt in these countries, unlike public investment 
expenditures. This corroborates the very conclusion of a previous study led by 
Perotti (2004) on five industrialized countries, including Germany and the UK.  As 
for the panel of developing countries, the coefficient of public investment 
expenditures is larger than the public consumption’s, and it is significant and 
positive. 
The differences between the two panels of countries in terms of GDP’s reaction 
to public investment expenditures can also be discussed from a “transitional 
dynamics” point of view. The model’s results confirm that public investment in the 
countries with the lower capital to GDP ratio has a larger explanatory power over 
the economic activity; also, returns generated by (private and public) investment 
are shown to be indeed progressively diminishing, ceteris paribus. This analysis 
tends to confirm Hypothesis 2 because when compared individually, Denmark, 
Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK do have larger capital stocks than Chile, 
Colombia, Jordan, Morocco and Slovenia. 
Nevertheless, said hypothesis is challenged by the model’s outputs regarding 
GFCF, since the latter seems to have a relatively better impact on GDP in the panel 
of advanced countries (a coefficient at 0.2613 compared to 0.2485), despite their 
high capital stock to GDP ratio and their position in terms of transitional dynamics. 
This could be explained by efficiency and profitability-based selectivity 
(Oukhallou, 2016). The countries of the first panel have lower levels of corruption, 
which usually helps keep both types of investment at a relatively efficient level2. 
Furthermore, the macroeconomic profitability of GFCF is also tributary to the 
economic agents’ behavior vis-à-vis risk. In developing countries, such as Morocco 
for instance, an important part of the overall investment is addressed to sectors that 
generate quick returns and have lower risks (e.g. real estate); the latter are also 
known to generate lower added value, hence the relatively smaller impact on GDP.  
But undoubtedly, GFCF shows a larger impact on GDP than public spending in 
general. This could be interpreted as the consequence of private investment’s 
effectiveness when it comes to generating economic growth, as it is a significant 
component of GFCF in all ten countries. It also suggests, to a certain extent, that 
government investment expenditures are not efficient, seen the tremendous gap 
between their coefficients and the GFCF’s in both sets of countries. This result is in 
fact different than research works made in developing countries particularly, e.g. 
Tunisia, where GDP growth was found to rely more on public investment and less 
on private capital (Casero, & Varoudakis, 2004; Boughzala et al., 2007). 
As regards to government consumption expenditures, they hold more 
explanatory power over GDP growth in the panel of advanced countries, with a 
 
2 According to the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2015, the least corrupt 
countries amongst our panels are Denmark (ranked 1st), Sweden (3rd), Germany and the UK (both at 
the 10th position). Spain is the only exception, as it is ranked at the 36th position, behind Chile (23rd) 
and Slovenia (35th). Jordan is 45th, Colombia is 83rd and Morocco seems to have the highest level of 
corruption level in the two panels (88th). 
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0.023 coefficient compared to around 0.01 in the panel of developing economies. 
This can be linked to the high level of public consumption in the former group of 
countries as shown in Table 1, as well as the presence of household income-
enhancing transfers among its major components. Said transfers are known to 
directly support the purchasing power of households with high consumption 
propensity, thereby improving the demand side of the economy. Moreover, the two 
groups of countries are put on an equal footing as regards to substitutability and 
transitional dynamics for this very variable, since public consumption does not 
crowd out private investment, unlike public investment expenditures. This shows 
the superiority of developed countries in terms of government consumption’s 
macroeconomic effectiveness. 
In a nutshell, the model confirms that public investment is more effective in 
developing countries. The impact on GDP’s evolution is positive in those 
countries, and despite being econometrically significant, its coefficient remains far 
below that of GFCF and, by extension, private investment. Our results also suggest 
that public investment spending is relatively counterproductive in advanced 
economies, most likely because of high levels of crowding out; the latter is driven 
by public-private capital substitutability and the respective position of these 
countries in terms of transitional dynamics.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This research paper examines the potential factors that determine the degree of 
influence laid by public investment on the evolution of GDP. The emphasis is laid 
on the potential differences between developed and developing countries in terms 
of public capital’s macroeconomic returns. In this perspective, we use a panel data 
econometrical model for two groups of countries that include respectively five 
advanced economies and five developing ones. 
In our endeavor, we test three main hypotheses based on the analysis elements 
provided by Oukhallou (2016). The first one stipulates that public investment 
efficiency is inversely correlated with the level of corruption; and that when public 
investment projects are not selected based on macroeconomic profitability, their 
marginal productivity is most likely to shrink as the negative macroeconomic 
impact of the crowding-out effect partially –or even totally- neutralizes the 
supposedly positive effect of said public investment on GDP growth. The second 
hypothesis is that public investment is likely to have a larger effect in small and 
middle income countries where the capital stock to GDP ratio is usually the lowest. 
In this perspective, returns generated by further public (or private) investment are 
assumed to be positive but progressively diminishing, ceteris paribus. The third 
hypothesis assumes that the higher is the public-private investment substitutability, 
the larger is the crowding-out effect, which drives a downward influence on public 
investment’s effectiveness.  
One intriguing result was that in the panel of developed economies, the 
coefficient that is associated with public investment spending is slightly negative. 
This finds a possible explanation in the existence of a substantial level of public-
private investment substitutability –in advanced countries, which generates higher 
crowding out effects; hence the downward influence on public investment 
expenditures’ effectiveness in advanced countries. In the group of developing 
countries, the impact of government investment expenditures is positive and larger 
than the public consumption’s.  
However, in all countries, the influence of public investment spending on 
GDP’s evolution remains significantly smaller when compared to GFCF; the 
impact of the latter is found to be substantial in both groups of countries. This 
globally suggests, to a certain extent, that government investment expenditures are 
usually not efficient, seen the tremendous gap between their coefficients and the 
GFCF’s in both sets of countries. On the other hand, government consumption 
expenditures seem to hold a larger explanatory power over GDP growth in the 
advanced countries compared to the developing economies. This result confirms 
Journal of Economics Bibliography 
JEB, 4(1), H. Goumrhar, & Y. Oukhallou, p.77-86. 
85 
the existence of significant levels of crowding out, since public current expenses 
are in principle not financed by public debt, unlike public investment expenditures. 
In a nutshell, the model confirms that public investment is more effective in 
developing countries. The impact on GDP’s evolution is positive in the latter group 
of countries, and despite being econometrically significant, its coefficient remains 
far below that of GFCF and, by extension, private investment. Our results also 
suggest that public investment spending is relatively counterproductive in 
advanced economies, most likely because of high levels of crowding out; the latter 
is driven by public-private capital substitutability and the respective position of 
these countries in terms of transitional dynamics.  
Basically, this empirical examination enables us to confirm Hypothesis 3. It also 
provides evidence that is consistent with Hypothesis 2, but only for the case of 
public investment. Moreover, our results suggest that Hypothesis 1 can be 
confirmed in the case of government consumption. The five advanced economies 
studied in this paper have the least corruption levels among the overall sample 
(except for Spain); at the same time, their government consumption expenditures 
have a better impact on GDP than in the five developing countries, which happen 
to have higher rates of corruption. Hypothesis 1 cannot however be ascertained 
when it comes to public investment. The potential effect of such a hardly 
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